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Abstract— Optical detection of random features in combination
with digital signatures based on public key codes in order to
recognise counterfeit objects will be discussed. Without applying
expensive production techniques objects are protected against
counterfeiting. Verification is done offline by optical means
without a central authority. The method is applied for pro-
tecting banknotes. Experimental results for this application are
presented. The method is also applicable for identity verification
of a credit– or chip–card holder.
Index Terms— security, fraud, optical detection, correlation,
paper, digital signatures
I. INTRODUCTION
H IGH security against counterfeit is achieved usually bycomplex methods too expensive or not accessible for
counterfeiters. Modern examples are credit cards with phase
masks[1] , banknotes with holograms[2] and smart identity
cards or keys. Unfortunately these methods have some serious
drawbacks: 1. technological progress might simplify copy-
ing in future, 2. expensive production techniques may only
suitable for mass products like credit cards or banknotes, 3.
professional fraudsters are hard to scare away by cost intensive
reproduction.
In order to avoid these problems, random features can be
used to obtain security against counterfeiting[3], [4], [5], [6].
These features have to be extremely complicated and therefore
very hard, if not impossible, to copy. Important examples are
the three–dimensional distribution of bubbles in transparent
materials, the fibre structure of paper or surface profiles in
connection with material properties. Microscopic features are
especially interessting for security purposes because they are
hard to copy.
Optical methods seem to be most suitable for the nonde-
structive detection of such features. After detection, the object
features are digitally stored on the object itself.
By using digital signatures based on public key codes, only
an authorised person is able to store the detected information.
As an example, we used this method in order to protect
German banknotes against counterfeiting. Practical results
obtained for this application are presented.
II. METHOD DESCRIPTION
The method used for protecting a banknote against coun-
terfeit is shown in figure 1. The fibre structure of a small
region of the banknote is detected by using a video microscope
and digitised with a frame grabber. After some basic image
processing, the image is compressed and a digital signature
using public key authentification, is appended. The result is
processed with a fault-tolerant code. This code is directly
printed onto the banknote. The coded image serves as a
reference for the verification process.
Fig. 1. Protection and verification of banknote
Verification of the banknote (see figure 1 ) is achieved by
detecting the fibre structure and comparing it with the digitally
stored reference image. The same setup as that of the coding
procedure is used in order to detect the fibre structure. The
coded reference image is read with a standard image scanner.
After decoding, this reference image is compared to the fibre
structure on the banknote. If the difference between both is
above a threshold, we assume a counterfeit banknote.
The use of digital signatures is essential for the working of
the method. These techniques (digital signatures are based on
asymmetric codes) guarantee that only one central authority
can produce the protected banknotes while everyone is able to
verify them.
In 1995 Chu et al[7] and Vaidya[8] proposed the use of
digital signatures in order to protect magnetic cards against
fraud. Chu used “fuzzy bits”, a very inexpensive and therefore
interessting approach. Unfortunately, copying such cards is
still possible by using non–standard card readers. Vaidya based
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Fig. 2. Experimental setup for the detection of fibre structure
his method on “Watermark Magnetics” 1, a technology control-
ling the orientations of magnetic particles during production
of the card. By using “sophisticated and secret production
techniques” this method claims to manufacture magnetic cards
which are “virtually impossible to copy”.
Our approach differs from these methods as we detect
random features, which are already present on the object, by
optical means. Therefore, high security without sophisticated
and secret production techniques is achieved. Differences
between our approach and the methods in refs [3], [4], [5] and
[6] are the explicit use of digital signatures and the security
features we use (the microscopic fibre structure of ordinary
paper).
In the following, we give a detailed description of the
different parts of the system and show experimental results
for our application.
III. DETAILED DESCRIPTION AND EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS
A. Image acquisition
For the detection of the fibre structure we use a standard
CCIR–CCD camera, an ITEX VFG frame grabber and a stan-
dard microscope objective (3.2 X, NA = 0.12). The banknote
is illuminated by a 35 W halogen bulb. The setup is depicted
in figure 2. Best contrast of the fibre structure was obtained by
putting the illumination source about 1 cm behind the banknote
( a German 5 DM banknote). A typical image obtained with
this method is shown in figure 4.
Since we use one part of the grabbed image only, exact
positioning of the banknote isn’t necessary. Orientation of the
banknote should be controlled to about 1 degree.
B. Image processing and coding
The image processing performed is shown in figure 3: first,
the region of interest within our image is extracted. In our
example we choose the area within one half of the letter
’B’ of “Bundesbank” printed on the banknote resulting in
a 180 × 200 pixel area with 8 bit gray scale. After edge–
sharpening according to ref. [10] the histogram is equalised
and smoothed with a simple 3 × 3 kernel (see figure 5). The
image is stored using lossy JPEG compression (a standard
platform independend image format) with 10 % quality and
20 % smoothing, resulting in about 2.86 KByte of data.
Of course we could further reduce the amount of data
by using less pixels which unfortunately diminished the im-
munity against noise and local errors. In order to optimise
performance, extensive statistical investigations concerning the
1Watermark Magnetics is a registered trade mark of THORN EMI
Fig. 3. Image processing
Fig. 4. Detected image
optimal number of pixels for the application at hand are
necessary.
C. Coding
For the data (2.86 KByte) obtained by the lossy compres-
sion, a digital signature is generated. Various well known
algorithms are available for this purpose. DSS (“Digital Sig-
nature Standard”[9]) and RSA authentification[11] are the
most prominent examples. Typically, the data is processed
with a one–way hash function (e.g. the MD5 or SHA-1
algorithm[12]) in order to generate a short description, the
so called “message digest”. This message digest is processed
with a public key authentification algorithm resulting in the
digital signature which is appended to the data.
By using asymmetric public key codes, we achieve that it
is possible for everyone to decrypt data using the public key
while encryption with this public key remains impossible.
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Fig. 5. Detected image after image processing
a.) b.)
Fig. 6. Correlation of reference with a.) the same banknote without
repositioning , b.) the same banknote but with repositioning
The institution manufacturing the banknotes therefore cre-
ates a private encryption key and the corresponding public key
for decryption. The encryption key is now used to create the
digital signatures. Using the public key, everyone can decode
the signatures and verify their authenticity. Since a falsifier
has no access to the private key, he isn’t able to create digital
signatures for the fibre structures which he detected on his
counterfeit banknotes.
We use the RSA algorithm in connection with the MD5
hash function and a 1024 Bit key (used with the public domain
software “pgp”) for the generation of the digital signature. This
results in a 60 bytes signature for our data files.
The image and its digital signature are coded afterwards in
order to transform the binary output into a printable format
(e.g. hex or bar codes). Because of dirt or damage, it is
possible that part of the printed information is unreadable on
the banknote. The coding should therefore insert redundancy
in order to obtain error correction abilities[16]. A non-local
distribution of information offers additional security against
localised damage and dirt.
D. Output
Storage of information is simple for credit–, chip– or
identity–cards. On credit– and chip–cards the data is stored
by magnetic or electronic means. With banknotes, only the
paper can be used for information storage. Therefore the coded
information has to be printed onto the banknote using a high
quality printer. Banknotes are fortunately large enough to store
two compressed and coded images by using only a small part
(7 %) of the available paper. We can print approximately 3250
detectable ASCII characters on an area of 5.0 cm2 with a
standard laser printer. The German 100 DM banknote has an
area of 222 cm2. Using a simple hamming(7,4) code we would
have to store 5 KByte per image resulting in a toleratable bit
error probability of 14 %.
Using two coded images means an additional redundancy
which further reduces the problems associated with dirty or
damaged banknotes.
The necessary storage capacity could be dramatically re-
duced if we would not store the complete bitmap but a high
level description of the fibres. Of course, it is a difficult
problem to automatically obtain such a description. Other
security features like bubbles in plastic are easier to describe
(3D coordinates of the bubbles).
E. Decoding
The coded reference image is read into the computer by
the aid of an image scanner. Error correction and decoding
is straightforward and only depends on the used code. After-
wards, the digital signature is checked with the public RSA
key in order to verify the authenticity of the digital data.
F. Verification of detected image with coded reference image
The detected image is compared with the coded reference
image. Different methods are possible. We use a non–linear
binary correlator with some post-processing of the obtained
output in order to achieve the necessary immunity against local
errors and additional noise.
First we multiply the spectrum of the reference image with
the complex conjugated spectrum of the detected image. The
result is binarized and inverse Fourier transformed to obtain
the correlation output. This correlation output is smoothed
2 times with a simple 3 × 3 kernel and normalised to 255
afterwards.
To avoid problems with the 0th order of the correlator, we
shift the reference image by a fixed amount. Small deviations
in the position of the banknote are not of concern since
this only results in a corresponding shift of the correlation
peak. The Fourier transforms are calculated electronically via
the fast–Fourier–transform (FFT) algorithm with additional
zero–padding. Acceleration is possible by using specialised
electronic hardware, equipped with FFT chips. By storing not
the reference image but rather its Fourier transform we can,
of course, reduce the computational cost by about one third.
For high-speed applications optical processing is necessary.
SSDA algorithms[15] might be an interesting alternative to
correlation methods with pure digital processing.
Figures 6, 7 and 8 show that easy detectable outputs with
this rather simple method are achieved. The images in figure 6
correspond to the same banknote without and with reposition-
ing. Figure 7 shows results for the same banknote with extreme
wrinkles and with dirt and writings on the detected ’B’. The
images in figure 8 depict results of correlation obtained with
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different other banknotes. We obtain detectable peaks at the
expected positions with the original banknote whereas the
counterfeit banknotes (in this case simply other banknotes)
don’t correlate at all. Further improvement is possible by
using more sophisticated correlators. It should be especially
advantageous to use (and store) optimised filters instead of
Fourier transforms of the reference images. Optimised binary
filters[14] would further reduce the necessary storage capacity.
Standard image processing techniques for the detection of
simple fraud should additionally be used.
a.) b.)
Fig. 7. Correlation of reference with a.) wrinkled banknote, b.) with dirty
banknote
a.) b.)
Fig. 8. Correlation of reference with different banknotes
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We used the optical detection of random features in connec-
tion with public key authentification for protecting banknotes
against counterfeiting. For this application experimental results
are presented. Besides banknotes, the method can be used for
credit– and chip–cards, checks, contracts, access control and
identification systems, artworks, machine parts and a lot of
other objects. For all these applications, most of the practical
problems we were confronted with banknotes (dirt, wrinkle,
low storage capacity) vanish. High security is obtained without
expensive production techniques because the complicated fea-
tures, used for verification, are already present on the object.
We want to point out, that instead of using random features
of objects, we can also detect, code and store characteristics
of persons who are authorised to use the objects. Possible
examples of such characteristics are fingerprints, speech or
retinal patterns, iris textures and faces. This is similar to a
patent of Eastman Kodak obtained in 1994[13]: fingerprints or
faces are stored on credit cards for verification of the correct
card holder identity. Since symmetric codes are used, a central
administration agency is needed. Offline verification is not
possible and a lot of practical problems occur; it is expensive
and seems not to be suitable for applications like world–wide
ATMs. By using the proposed asymmetric public–key codes
and random features, these problems can be avoided.
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